Security
#What is escaped
{expr}in markup always renders as text (a DOM text node), never as HTML.<p>{userInput}</p>is safe whateveruserInputcontains.- Attribute values are set with
setAttributeor the matching DOM property. They can't break out of the attribute. - Static text and attributes written in a template are escaped by the compiler.
renderToStringescapes text and attributes in the HTML it produces.
#What is not
innerHTML. <div innerHTML={html} /> inserts raw HTML, exactly like the DOM property. Never pass it content that a user can influence unless you sanitize it first, for example with DOMPurify:
<script lang="ts">
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify'
const { body } = props<{ body: string }>()
</script>
<article innerHTML={DOMPurify.sanitize(body)} />javascript: URLs. A dynamic URL attribute (href, src, action, formaction, xlink:href, poster, cite, background, ping) whose value is a javascript: URL is blocked: the attribute is removed and an error is logged. Browsers also accept variants with leading spaces, tabs inside the scheme and mixed case, and those are blocked too. A static href="javascript:…" written in the template is left alone, since the author wrote it. Other schemes, such as data: URLs in src, pass through. Validate them yourself if users can supply them.
srcdoc. <iframe srcdoc={html} /> renders html as a whole document, like innerHTML. Sanitize user content, or keep the iframe's sandbox without allow-same-origin.
Event handlers and spread. {...attrs} applies every key as an attribute, except keys like onClick or onclick: a function there becomes an event listener, and anything else is ignored. A dynamic inline handler attribute (onclick={…} as a string, from a spread or a binding) is never set. Still, don't spread objects that come from users.
Styles. A style={…} string that comes from user input can still do things like overlay the page. Prefer fixed classes.
#Content Security Policy
The runtime and compiled components don't use eval, new Function or inline event handler attributes. They work under a strict CSP such as script-src 'self'. In development, Vite injects styles with <style> tags, so style-src needs 'unsafe-inline' or a nonce there. Production builds emit CSS files.
Templates are parsed once per component by assigning the compiler's static HTML to a <template> element's innerHTML. A page that enforces Trusted Types (require-trusted-types-for 'script') needs a default policy that allows those assignments.
#Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately through GitHub security advisories, not in public issues.